Relibility and Falsifiability

    In science, a universally held conclusion that is disproven means that we can never be 100% sure new conclusions are correct, for the mere perception of truth does not make it so.  The prevailing paradigm of any given period, such as the Newtonian model of gravity- which held for two and a half centuries- is always vulnerable to being overturned.  That is why when we say that evidence supports a theory, we should be saying that the theory has a high probability of being correct, not that we can conclude it is a law of nature.   

    This seems to be in conflict with Hempel’s assertion that there must be at least one law of nature in the explanation of any scientific conclusion (Kitcher, 410-411).  A better way of saying this is that the laws of nature under certain parameters can be inferred through the process of induction.  Newton’s model of gravity holds true under certain parameters while Einstein’s holds true under all parameters yet known, which doesn’t necessarily make Einstein’s model a law of nature, only that it has a higher probability of being one than Newton’s.  As the number of parameters increase for any given theory being experimented on, the probability of its conclusion being proven or falsified increases.  That is why Karl Popper’s falsifiability is so important; just as conclusions that would support a theory increase as more evidence is observed, they must be capable of being disproved proportionally, otherwise they could fit the profile of every parameter.  

    Despite this seemingly nihilistic conclusion, I believe there are things in science we can know.  In our time, no scientist would deny that the Earth revolves around the sun.  Once a theory becomes validated by enough testing, it slowly becomes fact or a law on its own, by virtue of passing every test that would falsify it.  This is where I also disagree with Popper, who thought we should never stop trying to falsify a theory because we can never be completely sure that it’s true (Godfrey-Smith, 59).  There seems to come a point when falsifiability is no longer necessary, otherwise science gets bogged down by inefficiency. 

 

Godfrey-Smith, Peter.  2003.  Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science.  The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.  

Kitcher, Philip.  Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World.  APUS, Phil202 Week 2 readings, 410-505.